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Thrift Deregulation and the Mortgage Market
Overthe past several years, savings and loan asso-
ciations have diversified their asset portfolios by
increasing the share of nonmortgage investments.
This greater diversific:ation isnot surprising given
that deregulation and other forces have blurred
the boundaries marking financial institutions' tradi-
tional turf. However, it has raised concerns that the
more aggressive pursuit of nonmortgage activities
by savings institutions will reduce the flow of
funds available to finance housing. This Letter
examines the reasons for the increased portfolio
diversification and its implications for mortgage
credit.
Asset diversification
Historically, regulations have limited the options
for savings and loans to invest directly in non-
mortgage assets. The regulatory restrictions were
strongly reinforced by the tax code. By holding 60
percent of its assets in residential mortgages and
certain other qualifying assets, a savings and loan is
able to defer taxes on a portion of its income. To
protect the maximum proportion of income possi-
ble (40 percent), a thrift must hold at least 82 per-
cent of its assets in the qualifying assets.
With these regulatory restrictions and taxincen-
tives, savings and loans entered the 1980s holding
over 85 percent of their assets in mortgage loans
and mortgage-backed securities. Over the past
several years, however, the asset mix has changed
dramatically. Mortgages and mortgage-backed
securities combined fell from 851f2 percentof
assets at FSLlC-insured savings institutions at the
endof1979 to a little over 73 percent in Decem-
ber 1984.
Changes in the regulations governing the invest-
ment powers of savings and loans provide a
natural starting point for explaining this marked
portfolio shift. In 1980, the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act(MCA)
expanded asset powers for federally chartered
savings and loans. Among other things, the Act
provided more latitude for thrifts to extend con-
sumer loans and to invest in commercial paper and
other corporate securities.
As important as these regulatory changes may
have been, they were notsufficient to causethe
dramatic decline seen in the ratio of mortgage
holdings to assets atthrift institutions. In fact, long
before MCA, state-chartered savings and loans in a
number of states had fairly broad authority to
engage in nonmortgage lending. Yet mostof these
institutions chose notto exercise their asset
powers mainly because of the tax advantages as-
sociated with residential mortgage lending.
In recent years, the poor performance ofearnings
among thrifts has diluted the appeal of these tax
incentives. In the latter part of1981 and during the
first part of1982, over three-quarters ofall
federally insured savings and loans reported nega-
tive net income. With the subsequent decline in
interest rates, the earnings situation atsavings and
loans began to improve. In 1983 and 1984, the
savings and loan industry as a whole posted posi-
tive net earnings following two years of losses.
Nevertheless, by mid-1984 one-fourth ofall
federally insured savings institutions still were re-
porting losses.
The relaxed regulatory constraints on asset diver-
sification, combined with the blunting of tax
incentives, seem sufficientto explain the change
we saw in the asset composition ofsavings and
loans. However, further analysis suggests that
these factors were not as importantas a first
glancewould indicate.
First, as shown in Chart 1, nonmortgage loans
account for only a small portion of the rise in the
ratio of nonmortgage assets to total assets in
recent years. Second, special factors account for
the changes in "otherassets," shown in Chart 1.
For example, included in "otherassets" is "good-
will and other intangible assets." The value of this
asset category was boosted considerably through
the purchase accounting procedures used in sav-
ings and loan mergers. The rise in the ratio of
"otherassets" to total assets also reflected savings
and loans' investments in their service corporation
subsidiaries, a power they already held before
MCA.FRBSF
Increased liquidity
The growth in "cash and securities" overthe past
several years also points to factors other than the
relaxation ofasset "restrictions" in influencing the
asset mix at thrifts. The bulkofcash and securities
are federal government or federally sponsored
agency securities, bank CDs and federal funds,
which savings and loans were empowered to hold
before MCA. The increase in their holdings could
reflect factors affecting small-denomination (core)
deposits at thrift institutions. A possible connec-
tion is that savings and loans accumulated "cash
and securities" in the face ofdeposit interest rate
deregulation which stimulated strong core deposit
flows relative to the demand for mortgages at
these thrift institutions.
However, the simultaneous buildup of managed
liabilities at savings and loans following deposit
ratederegulation conflicts with the notion that
these institutions were reacting to an increase in
the supply ofcore deposits relative to the demand
for mortgages. From 1979to 1984, managed
liabilities at savings and loans (large-denomination
CDs, Federal Home Loan Bank advances, RPs,
mortgage-backed bonds, and other borrowings)
rose from about 141/2 percent of total liabilities and
networth to 26 percent. This greater reliance on
managed liabilities suggests that the increase in
liquid assets at savings and loans probably
reflected a higherdemand for liquidity by thrifts,
rather than only strong flows of core deposits.
The volatility in interest rates through most of the
1979-1984 period may have provoked the thrifts'
heightened demand for liquidity. In addition, a
byproductofderegulation has been a shortening
in the overall maturity ofcore deposits. As a result,
savings and loans could have been attempting to
increase holdings ofshort-term assets such as
those in "cash and securities."
Implications for the mortgage market
The proposition that a link exists between the
asset mix ofsavings and loans and the allocation of
credit to housing is a variant of the one thatties
the volume of total mortgage credit to deposit
growth at thrifts. In the latter proposition, the pro-
portion ofcredit flows allocated to mortgages is
assumed to vary directly with the share of funds
channeledthrough thrifts. Ifthis were true, it
follows·that ifthrifts reduce their propensity to
invest in mortgage-related assets, then, all else
remaining equal, a smaller fraction ofcredit flows
would go to mortgages, and mortgage rates would
rise relative to other market rates.
For deposit flows at thrifts and their mix of assets
to change the allocation of credit to the mortgage
market requires that developments specific to
those institutions not be offset by other lenders. In
other words, it requires that mortgage borrowers
at thrift institutions be cut off from turning to other
existing mortgage lenders or from turning to other
sources of funds in financial markets. Some degree
of such separation might be expected in the short
run if institutional arrangements for channeling
funds in the credit market are costly to adjust and
the market disruptions are viewed only as tempo-
rary. However, it seems reasonable to expect that a
permanent change in the propensity of thrifts to
extend mortgage loans would induce adjustments
by other lenders.
There exists an additional flaw in the argument
thata lower proportion of thrift assets allocated to
mortgages translates intoa reduced supply of
mortgage credit. A reduction in the ratio of
mortgages to assets at thriftinstitutions does not
necessarily imply adecline in their mortgage lend-
ing. The volume of mortgageloans heldby savings
and loans can increase as the ratio of mortgages to
assets declines if total assets grow ata faster rate.
This last point is particularly important in light of
the impact that deposit deregulation had in caus-
ing reintermediation - that is, return flows of
small-denomination deposits to savings and loans.
In addition, the level of intermediation carried out
by savings and loans has been boosted by their
increased reliance on managed liabilities. The
effectof these two phenomena was quite evident
in 1984, a year in which assets of federally insured
saVings institutions expanded by almost 20 per-
cent and mortgage holdings also rose by about
151/2 percent. Thus, since the changing mix of
assets was accompanied by rapid growth in assets,
the nonmortgage activities of savings and loans
complimented, rather than substituted for, their
mortgage lending.
Some evidence
If the change in the asset mix at savings and loans
had an impact on the amountof funds channeled
to mortgages, this impact should be reflected in
the behavior of mortgage interest rates. In that
case, the smaller the share of savings and loan
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rates should be relative to other market rates.
However, an empirical investigation of the rela-
tionship between savings and loan asset composi-
tion and mortgage interest rates did not turn up
any systematic association. For the period from
mid-1978 through 1984, the fraction of net asset
acquisitions by savings and loans allocated to
mortgages had no significant effect on the interest
rate for fixed-rate mortgages.
These results are consistent with the evidence on
the relation between the proportion of savings and
loan assets devoted to mortgages and the overall
allocation of funds to mortgages by all lenders
shown in Chart 2. The dashed line in the chart
represents the quarterly change in mortgages at
FSLlC-insured institutions as a percent of the
change in their total assets, while the solid line
shows net extensions of mortgages by all lenders,
including households, as a share of borrowing by
individuals and private nonfinancial firms in the
United States.
The shaded region in the chart sets off the period
in which the shift to nonmortgage assets at savings
and loans was most pronounced. During that
period, the ratios of mortgages to private domestic
nonfinancial borrowing varied but, on balance,
tended to rise, notfall. Rather than savings and
loan portfolio changes, the movements of the ratio
oftotal mortgage lending to private borrowing in
the early 1980s appear to reflect changes in
interest rates (largely through their effects on the
ability and willingness of borrowers to purchase
homes). The peak in the ratio of mortgages to pri-
vate borrowing due to distortions during the 1980
credit control period aside, the ratio of mortgages
to private borrowing fell in late 1980and early
1981 as market interest rates rose. The ratio
remained low relative to the late 1970s until the
second half of1982 when market rates began faIl-
ing sharply.
As net mortgage flows at FSLlC-insured institutions
(measured as a share ofthe change inassets)
stabilized between mid~1983and the third quarter
of1984, the ratio of total mortgages to the volume
ofaggregate private borrowing fell. On balance, it
does notappear that there has been aconsistent
positive (or negative) relation between changes in
the relative allocation of funds to mortgages by
savings institutions and the share ofaggregate bor-
rowing accounted for by mortgages.
Conclusion
New asset powers for savings and loans have con-
tributed to a greater diversification of their assets,
although these were not the only stimuli. Poor
earnings, the use of purchase accounting in thrift
mergers, and changes affecting thrift liabilities also
have influenced the composition of savings and
loan assets.
This aggressive pursuit of nonmortgage invest-
ment by savings and loans has raised somecon-
cerns that fewer funds overall would be available
for mortgage lending. Contrary to this concern,
greater asset diversification at savings and loans
has not been detrimental to the mortgage market.
Fred Furlongand Kimya Moghadam
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loans, Leases and Investments1 2 192,509 - 224 10,977 6.0
Loans and Leases1 6 174,160 363 11,578 7.1
Commercial and Industrial 51,647 245 1,712 3.4
Real estate 63,622 116 2,935 4.8
Loans to Individuals 34,811 87 6,139 21.4
Leases 5,~89 - 43 370 7.3
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,522 - 602 - 439 - 3.6
Other Securities2 6,828 15 - 160 - 2.2
Total Deposits 197,628 - 352 9,504 5.0
Demand Deposits 47,044 - 252 2,878 6.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 31,653 - 178 3,222 11.3
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,818 - 149 1,558 12.7
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,765 48 5,066 3.8
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,836 137 6,737 17.6
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 37,646 - 65 - 2,648 - 6.5
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,773 955 2,704 12.8
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures














1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
s Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change